This paper empirically investigates the effect of international simple resale (ISR) authorization on the prices for international message telephone service (IMTS). We compile a firm-level panel data set for over 200 United States-foreign country bilateral markets from 1995 to 2004. These data provide detailed information on prices, variable costs, fixed costs and market shares for 75 firms for each bilateral market, as well as the timing of ISR authorization by the Federal Communications Commission for each bilateral market. Estimates from a difference-in-differences model show that ISR authorization, and the associated lowering of barriers to entry, almost always results in lower prices for all markets. Additionally, we find evidence that ISR authorization alters the relationship between market concentration and price. Prior to ISR authorization more concentrated markets have higher prices. ISR authorization dampens this effect and in some cases reverses the relationship so that market concentration is negatively correlated with IMTS prices set by incumbent firms. , 2006; and Ju and Tan, 2008). Our paper differs from these by using a richer source of firm-level data for more foreign country markets and years.
Introduction
In 1994 The unbundling of IMTS network elements, made possible with ISR authorization, has allowed potential new entrants to avoid the large sunk costs from investment in the network infrastructure typically required by incumbent facilities-based (FB) carriers. New entrants can use ISR to provide IMTS by acquiring an international private line, and paying an access charge to connect this line with the networks of the originating and terminating countries. While new entrants have initial start-up costs for marketing and billing infrastructure, and must purchase an exchange facility to connect individual network elements, these costs are relatively small compared to the fixed costs incurred with full FB entry. Given mobile production factors, i.e., network access, and relatively costless entry and exit conditions, ISR authorization should be associated with relatively more entry in IMTS markets.
IMTS provision is a classic example of markets where consumers have switching costs. Economic models with switching costs indicate that market entry may influence the pricing decisions of incumbent firms by leading to either higher or lower prices.
The conventional result is that entry makes markets more competitive thus lowering incumbent prices. Contrary to the conventional result Klemperer (1987) , Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) show that incumbent firms may behave as fat-cats and increase their price in response to entry. In addition incumbent firms may strategically respond to the threat of potential entry or future entry by limit pricing or limit over-pricing (Klemperer 1987) . With a limit pricing strategy, incumbent firms strategically lower their price to deter entry. Once entry occurs the limit price is not maintained and the effect of entry is to increase the incumbent's price. With limit overpricing the effect of entry may be to decrease the incumbent's price. Ennis, 2006; and Ju and Tan, 2008) . Our paper differs from these by using a richer source of firm-level data for more foreign country markets and years.
Other studies have also found that market entry and a lower level of market concentration are sometimes correlated with higher prices (See Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Ward et. al., 2002; Perloff et. al., 2005; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; and Chen and Savage, 2009 ).
Our paper contributes to this "competition increasing price" literature by offering new evidence from telephony markets, and by documenting price differences between ISR and non-ISR markets that vary systematically with the extent of market concentration.
The evaluation of ISR is also important to policy makers. Recently, the price of IMTS has declined. However, the cost of international private lines used to provide IMTS service has significantly decreased as well, which means the overall effect of entry on prices is ambiguous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background motivating our empirical analysis. Section 3 briefly describes some recent trends in United States IMTS markets and describes the data used in estimation. Section 4 presents the empirical model. Section 5 reports the estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Background
This section provides theoretical justification for why entry may increase or decrease incumbent's prices in markets with consumer switching costs. Incumbent firms may strategically respond to entry in the future or to the threat of potential entry. Klemperer's (1987) model is adapted to show how incumbent firms respond to entry in the future. To some extent, Klemperer's (1987) model is similar to the models of Bulow et.al. (1985) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and Klemperer (1988) . Similarities and differences between these models are discussed.
In the basic model, there are two firms: an incumbent (I); and an entrant (E). In the first period (1), the incumbent chooses a strategic variable, quantity or price, S where δ is the discount rate. In the first period, the incumbent chooses to maximize the discounted sum of profits and the first-order condition is as follows.
(1)
If firms do not behave strategically in the first period to entry in period 2, =0
(Klemperer 1987). If firms behave strategically in the first period, then and either incumbent firms use a limit pricing strategy or limit over-pricing to deter future
entry. An incumbent firm may use a limit pricing strategy when . With a limit pricing strategy, the incumbent firm is overly aggressive in period 1 (S I 1 is large) which leads to lower profits in the first period and makes the entrant less aggressive in the second period. Alternatively when , an incumbent firm may use a limit overpricing strategy where the incumbent is less aggressive in period 1 (S I 1 is small). Being less aggressive in the first period, forces the incumbent to be more aggressive in the second period and the entrant knowing the incumbent will be aggressive is less aggressive otherwise. Klemperer (1987) shows that when switching costs are sufficiently large a limit over-pricing strategy is not an equilibrium.
Besides responding strategically to entry in the future, an incumbent firm will respond to actual entry once it occurs. The conventional result is that entry makes markets more competitive and thus lowers the price. In contrast to the conventional result, Rosenthal (1980) develops a model where entry causes the price to increase. Entry increases the price when an incumbent cannot price discriminate between previous consumers who are locked-in and consumers with no lock-in. As firms enter in Rosenthal's model, the incumbent firm finds it more profitable to increase its price and tailor to consumers who are locked-in. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Klemperer (1987) find the same result of entry increasing price with a switching costs model where new consumers enter the market each period. New consumers are not locked-in to an incumbent while a firm's previous consumers are locked-in. With entry, incumbent firms concede new consumers to the entrant while raising prices and exploiting the lock-in of their previous consumers.
Incumbents behaving in this fashion are referred to as "fat-cats" (Farrell and Klemperer 2007 ).
Whether or not firms are responding to entry in the future or entry as it occurs, entry may either increase or decrease an incumbent's price. If incumbent firms limit price to deter entry or act as fat-cats, the effect of entry will be to increase an incumbent's price. With limit pricing incumbent firms set an artificially low price to deter entry and once entry actually occurs the incentives to maintaining a limit price are eliminated. If incumbent firms limit over-price or markets become more competitive with entry, then entry will decrease the price.
For IMTS markets, ISR authorization both increases the probability of entry in the future and causes actual entry to occur. The effect of ISR authorization may be to either increase or decrease an incumbent's price. ISR authorization will increase an incumbent's price if incumbents behave as fat-cats or use a limit pricing strategy. ISR authorization will decrease an incumbent's price if markets become more competitive with entry. When estimating the effect of ISR on incumbent prices in IMTS markets, a positive effect could be attributed to either a limit pricing strategy or fat-cat behavior. A negative effect of ISR indicates that markets become more competitive with entry.
Data

IMTS market trends
Figures 1 through Figure 3 provide a recent overview of United States IMTS markets. Figure 1 shows that over time the average revenue per minute of IMTS decreases while the number of minutes increases. It is important to note that the price of IMTS is not necessarily decreasing because of ISR authorization, although the dramatic decrease in price after 1994 tends to be associated with the FCC's first ISR authorizations for Canada and the United Kingdom. Figure 2 shows that the average revenue received by carriers for providing private line capacity has also decreased over time which
indicates that the cost of providing IMTS is decreasing. The decline in the price of IMTS could just as easily be explained by a reduction in costs as it could be attributed to ISR authorization. Note that in Figure 2 , the average revenue for private lines to Canada and Mexico are not decreasing over time as these lines are mostly terrestrial unlike the other categories. Figure 3 shows substantial growth in international capacity since 1995.
Data sources
We use the Section 43. indicating a high degree of average concentration.
Variables and summary statistics
Empirical Model
Model
We estimate the effects of ISR with a DID model that compares the prices of incumbent facilities-based firms operating in bilateral markets with ISR authorization to the prices of incumbents operating in markets without ISR. The model for firm i in market j at year t is:
where PRICE is the real price per minute for a call from the United States to foreign country j. ISR equals one if the FCC authorized international simple resale and zero otherwise. HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of market concentration. COST is the real cost per minute for terminating a call from the United States to foreign country j.
The α's are firm fixed effects, the η's are year fixed effects and ε is an error.
The parameter of interest is ∂PRICE i /∂ISR = β. All other things being equal, the estimate of β shows the difference in incumbent's prices due to ISR authorization. A finding of β < 0 indicates that low-cost market entry, as measured by ISR authorization, decreases the incumbent's prices. This result is consistent with the notion that lower barriers to entry make IMTS markets more competitive. Conversely, a finding of β > 0 indicates that ISR authorization increases an incumbent's price. This result is consistent with competition increasing the price whereby a strategic incumbent raises prices with entry because it has been practicing limit pricing or the incumbent is a fat-cat. Additional insight into potential competition increasing the price effect can be gleamed from an alternative specification of the price equation that includes an interaction term, so that:
For example, an estimate of ψ < 0 would suggest that in markets where ISR is permitted, increased competition, as measured by a decrease in market concentration, can actually raise IMTS prices. An estimate of ψ < 0 would also suggest that in markets where ISR is permitted, a greater degree of market concentration may lead to a lower price.
The DID estimate(s) of β (and ψ) is (are) consistent when ISR authorization is randomly assigned between bilateral markets. Policy endogeneity can arise when unobserved time varying market factors affect the timing of the FCC's ISR authorization decision. One way to minimize this bias is with instrumental variables. However, finding market-level economic and political instruments that are significant determinants of ISR authorization, but are not correlated with prices is difficult. Alternatively, it is possible to decompose the error term into observed and unobserved market-time components that may be correlated with PRICE and ISR so that:
where Z is a vector of observed market-time variables that control for regulatory and political-economy factors that may be correlated with ISR authorization,, TREND is a vector of market-specific time trends that control for unobserved foreign country market effects that vary through time and e is an error term.
Estimation Results
The empirical model and data described above are used to empirically examine the effects of ISR authorization on United States IMTS prices. We estimate several alternative model specifications of the price equations (2) and (3). First, we estimate the full sample of the data and secondly, on a sub-sample of "high income"/"high revenue" markets.
Full sample estimates
DID model estimates on the full sample of 218 US-foreign country markets are presented in Table 3 . Because our observations represent firms in bilateral markets, it is possible that there are shocks that are common or correlated across firms within markets.
While this does not affect the consistency of our estimator, it does impact the standard error. To address this issue, we allow correlations in the residuals across firms in the same market when computing these standard errors. This is reasonable, for example, if some unobservable characteristics of firm pricing behavior are determined at the market level.
The first column shows the coefficient estimates and standard errors for model (i), the baseline specification (2) higher IMTS prices than more concentrated markets. 4 To control for demand-side effects that vary across countries and through time, we are currently augmenting our firm data with information on gross domestic product, number of telephone lines and international trade, obtained at the foreign country level from the World Bank (2009) and the International Telecommunications Union (2009). GDP is the real gross domestic product per capita of foreign country j, LINES is the number of telephone lines in foreign country j, and TRADE is the sum of exports and imports between the United States and foreign country j. We are also constructing an additional cost control that varies across countries and through time, CAP, which is the capacity in bits per second between the United States and foreign country j.
An alternative way to interpret these results is to examine the sign of ∂PRICE/∂HHI, where ∂PRICE/∂HHI = 0.0024 -0.0039ISR from Model (iv). The expected sign of ∂PRICE/∂HHI is positive so that prices are higher in markets which are more concentrated. In markets where ISR is not permitted, ∂PRICE/∂HHI is positive as expected, but this result is revered for markets where ISR is authorized. Even in Model
(ii) and Model (iii), the sign of ψ is negative indicating that ISR authorization fundamentally changes the relationship between market concentration and price.
Sub sample estimates
Economic theory suggests that the effect of competition on prices may vary across high and low-revenue markets. To account for this source of heterogeneity, we estimate the DID model on a sub sample of 99 US-foreign country "high income" markets. A market is classified as high income when the gross national income per capita of the foreign country is greater than $3,856, as defined by the World Bank (2009).
Sub sample estimates are reported in columns one through four in Table 4 .
Overall, the estimates have a similar a qualitative flavor to those reported for the full sample in 
Conclusions
This paper has empirically examined the effects of ISR authorization on IMTS prices for the United States. We find that ISR authorization, and the associated lowering of barriers to entry, resulted in lower prices in almost all markets. Additionally, we find evidence that ISR authorization alters the relationship between market concentration and price. Prior to ISR authorization more concentrated markets have higher prices. ISR authorization dampens this effect and in some cases reverses the relationship so that market concentration is negatively correlated with IMTS prices set by incumbent firms.
In summary, our preliminary results provide some additional evidence for the competition increasing price literature by showing that in some markets where ISR is permitted, competition is positively correlated with IMTS prices. Future work will consider additional controls for the potential endogeneity of ISR authorization and appropriate robustness checks. More insight would also be obtained by linking the empirical results more tightly to the theoretical literature.
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